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CASE COMMENT
RENO V ACLU: ESTABLISHING A FIRST AMENDMENT
LEVEL OF PROTECTION FOR THE INTERNET
Rebecca Jakubcin***
Respondents,' who sought an order restraining the enforcement of the
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA),2 contended that the CDA
violates the First Amendment 3 by suppressing the rights of adults to transmit
and receive indecent material.4 Petitioners, Attorney General of the United
States Janet Reno and the U.S. Department of Justice, defended the
constitutionality of the provisions of the CDA that regulate the availability
of obscene, indecent, and patently offensive material to minors on the
Internet. 5 In three separate opinions, a three-judge district court6 unanimously granted the preliminary injunction sought by respondents in relation to the7
regulation of "indecent" communication, but not in relation to obscenity.
Petitioners appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme Court,8 which, despite
acknowledging a valid governmental interest in protecting children, 9 affirmed
and HELD that the challenged provisions violate the First Amendment to the
extent that they unduly burden the rights of adults to communicate and
In
receive indecent and patently offensive material over the Internet.'
reaching this decision, the Court gave Internet communications the most
protection allowed under the First Amendment by placing Internet com-

* Editor's Note: This case comment received the Huber C. Hurst Award for the
outstanding case comment for Fall 1997.
** This comment is dedicated to John, Diane, and Johnny Jakubcin.
1. This case is a consolidation of two actions brought by a total of forty-seven plaintiffs.
Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2339 (1997).
2. Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C.A § 223(a)-(h) (1996).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I (stating in part that "Congress shall make no law.., abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press").
4. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2339, 2341.
5. Id. at 2342.
6. Id. at 2339. The three-judge district court convened pursuant to a special provision
of the CDA. Id.
7. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 849-50 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
8. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2340-41. Direct appeal is allowed by a special provision of the
CDA. Id.
9. Id. at 2346.
10. Id. at 2350.
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munications in the same category as print media.1
The First Amendment has long stood for the principle of free speech in
the United States. 12 However, this guarantee of freedom of speech is not
without limits, especially when the speaker is the mass media.1 3 The level
of First Amendment protection afforded to the media differs among its
various types. 4 The print media have traditionally enjoyed a higher level
of First Amendment protection than other types of media. In Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,15 the U.S. Supreme Court illustrated its reluc-16
tance to interfere with the First Amendment rights of the print media.
Appellee, a candidate for public office, sought space, pursuant to a right to
reply statute, in the appellant's newspaper to rebut several editorials that were
printed by the appellant criticizing the appellee. 7 The appellant denied this
request and in the ensuing litigation, maintained that the First Amendment
forbade the state from requiring the appellant to include the reply. 8
The Court agreed with the appellant and noted that governmental
restrictions on print media have traditionally been viewed unfavorably by the
Court.' 9 The Court relied on the fact that the press has a history of

11. See id. at 2344.
12. See Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 500 (1952).
13. See id. at 502-03 (deciding that motion pictures receive First Amendment protection,
but that this protection is not unlimited).
14. Compare Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (deciding
that mandatory access to print media is unconstitutional), and Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Public Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1986) (holding that a utility company that
distributed a monthly newsletter in its billing envelope could not be compelled to include in
that newsletter the views of a group challenging the utility's rate-making policies without
violating the utility's First Amendment free-speech rights), with Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367, 400-01 (1969) (validating an FCC order requiring a radio station to give equal
time for response to a victim of a personal attack), and FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,
749-50 (1978) (approving the FCC's regulation of a patently offensive radio broadcast).
15. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
16. See id. at 258. The Court noted:
A newspaper is more than a passive receptacle or conduit for news, comment, and
advertising. The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made
as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues
and public officials - whether fair or unfair - constitute the exercise of editorial
control and judgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation
of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with the First Amendment
guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this time.
Id. (footnote omitted).
17. Id. at 243-44. The editorials attacked appellee's candidacy based on appellee's past
political actions as Executive Director of the Classroom Teachers Association. Id.
18. Id. at 244, 247.
19. Id. at 254-55. " 'The power of a privately owned newspaper to advance its own
political, social, and economic views is bounded by only two factors: first, the acceptance of
a sufficient number of readers - and hence advertisers - to assure financial success; and,
second, the journalistic integrity of its editors and publishers.' " Id. at 255 (quoting CBS, Inc.
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representing the wide and varied opinions of the citizens of the United
States.2" This historical representation has been possible because of low
barriers to entry into the realm of publishing.2 Additionally, the popularity
of pamphlets, books, and small town newspapers, gave forums for expression
of ideas not covered by the mainstream newspapers.22 The Court recognized that today's print media differs in character from its historical
forerunner. Today, large, national newspaper chains dominate newspaper
ownership.23 Furthermore, cities now often have only one main newspaper
rather than many small local papers or news pamphlets. Despite this drastic
limitation in the diversity of today's print media,24 the Court still afforded
the print media their traditional level of protection.25
As illustrated in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications
Commission,26 the broadcast media are afforded less First Amendment
protection than the print media. 27 In response to a fifteen-minute broadcast
in which his book and reputation were criticized, an author demanded,
29
fo
2 e8
pursuant to the fairness doctrine, free reply time from the radio station.
The radio station denied this request, and the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) determined that the station had violated the fairness
doctrine.30 The U.S. Supreme Court emphasized the differences between

v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973)).
20. Id. (rejecting appellee's argument that because today's press is one of limited access,
regulation of it is justifiable).
21. Id. at 248.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 249.
24. Id. at 249-50, 254. The Court agreed with appellee's assertion:
Newspapers have become big business and there are far fewer of them to serve a
larger literate population. Chains of newspapers, national newspapers, national wire
and news services, and one-newspaper towns, are the dominant features of a press
that has become noncompetitive and enormously powerful and influential in its
capacity to manipulate popular opinion and change the course of events.
Id. at 249 (footnotes omitted).
25. Id. at 258.
26. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
27. See id. at 386 (finding that while all media are protected by the First Amendment,
different types of media get different levels of First Amendment protection).
28. Id. at 369. The fairness doctrine requires broadcasters to give equal air time to
political candidates. Id. As a result of FCC rulings, the fairness doctrine requires radio and
television broadcasters to give fair coverage to public issues presented on their stations. Id.
at 369-70. Specifically, Red Lion dealt with the fairness doctrine in the context of political
editorials and personal attacks. Id. at 370-71.
29. Id. at 371-72.
30. Id. at 372. The station violated the doctrine by not providing the author with a tape,
summary, or transcript of the broadcast in which the author was attacked. ld. Additionally,
the station failed to offer the author free time to reply to the allegations. Id.
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the radio and the print media. 3' Specifically, the Court focused on the fact
that broadcast frequencies are a scarce commodity and thus receive less First
Amendment protection than print media.32 Reviewing the fairness doctrine
under this lower level of protection, the Court held that the fairness doctrine
does not violate the Constitution.33
34 the
In Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation,
Court again relied on the unique properties of the broadcast media to
distinguish broadcasting from the print media.35 Respondent, a broadcasting
company, challenged the FCC's power to regulate broadcasts that are
indecent but not obscene.36 The challenge came after one of respondent's
radio stations received a warning from the FCC for broadcasting a
monologue that contained indecent and patently offensive language.37
To achieve the protection of a valid governmental interest in protecting
children and unwilling adults from the indecent broadcast, the Court relied
on the unique nature of broadcasting. 38 First, the Court noted that the
broadcast media have a "pervasive presence" because they confront
Americans in their homes.39 Second, the Court emphasized that because
listeners and viewers are constantly tuning in and out, prior warnings are

31. Id. at 376-77, 386-88 (noting that without governmental regulation radio would not
function properly because of an overuse of the frequencies and because of this danger the
government properly regulates broadcast).
32. Id. at 388. The Court emphasized the chaotic radio environment that existed before
the Radio Act of 1927 in which the government divided the radio spectrum and assigned
portions of it for various uses such as public broadcasting, police radio, aircraft, and amateur
operation. Id. As part of this division, the portions of frequencies available for public
broadcasting became limited. Id. This limitation created the need for the licensing system
whereby some individuals were turned down in their requests for the right to broadcast to the
public. Id. at 388-89.
33. Id. at 375.
34. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
35. Id. at 748-50.
36. Id. at 729.
37. Id. at 730-31.
38. Id. at 748. Specifically, the Court noted:
We have long recognized that each medium of expression presents special
First Amendment problems. And of all forms of communication, it is broadcasting
that has received the most limited First Amendment protection. Thus, although
other speakers cannot be licensed except under laws that carefully define and narrow
official discretion, a broadcaster may be deprived of his license and his forum if the
Commission decides that such an action would serve "the public interest, convenience, and necessity." Similarly, although the First Amendment protects
newspaper publishers from being required to print the replies of those whom they
criticize, it affords no such protection to broadcasters; on the contrary, they must
give free time to the victims of their criticism.
Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 309a) (citations omitted).
39. Id.
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inadequate to protect an unwilling receiver from indecent broadcasts.'n
Finally, the Court relied on the fact that children, even those who cannot
read, may easily access the broadcast media.4 ' Because of these unique
properties, the Court found the regulation of broadcast media valid.
The Court made yet another distinction between the various communication media in Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. Federal
Communications Commission.4 At issue in Sable was the constitutionality
of a provision of the Communications Act of 1934,44 which banned indecent
and obscene commercial telephone messages. 45 Despite the government's
compelling interest in protecting children from indecent material,46 the
Court held that the statute, with respect to its regulation of indecency,
violated the First Amendment. 47 The Court reasoned that the dial-a-porn
messages, which are telephone numbers one can call to receive obscene
messages, were distinct from the broadcast media because affirmative action
on the part of the listener is required to receive a dial-a-porn message. 48 A
dial-a-porn caller would not be taken by surprise by an indecent message like
a radio listener would if a sudden indecent message were broadcast. 49 The
Court reasoned that the absence of the problem of unwilling listeners justified
affording dial-a-porn greater First Amendment protection than is afforded to
broadcasting.5 °
In the instant case, the U.S. Supreme Court went further when it
distinguished the Internet from traditional broadcast media by providing the
Internet with full First Amendment protection.5 Due to the differences
between the Internet and broadcast media, the Court found it unnecessary to
limit the level of First Amendment protection given to the Internet.5 2 In
accord with its reasoning in Red Lion and Pacifica, the Court emphasized

40. Id.
41. Id. at 749.
42. Id. at 750.
43. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
44. 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (1994).
45. Sable, 492 U.S. at 117-18, 123 n.5.
46. Id. at 126 (arguing that the government has a compelling interest in protecting the
physical and psychological well-being of minors, but this interest must be served by narrowly
tailored means).
47. Id. at 131. The Court deemed the statute's regulation of obscene language
constitutional, because obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 124.
48. Id. at 127-28.
49. Id. at 128.
50. Id. "Unlike an unexpected outburst on a radio broadcast, the message received by one
who places a call to a dial-a-porn service is not so invasive or surprising that it prevents an
unwilling listener from avoiding exposure to it." Id.
51. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2343-44.

52. Id.
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aspects of the broadcast media that are not present on the Internet.53 First,
the Court reasoned that the Internet does not suffer from a scarcity of
available frequencies as does the broadcast media. 54 Anyone who wishes
to exercise their First Amendment right to free speech or to receive
information on the Internet is not limited by difficulty of access.5 5 The
Court noted that anyone with access to a computer with Internet capabilities
can express their views and receive information relatively inexpensively and
easily.5 6 In fact, the Court reasoned, the Internet takes freedom of speech57
to a new level by providing easy access to millions of computer users.
Because of this ability to access the Internet with relative ease, the Court held
that the "scarcity of available frequencies" justification for the regulation of
the broadcast media is not applicable to the Internet.5 8
Secondly, in light of its evaluation of the broadcast media in Pacifica, the
instant Court examined whether the Internet possesses the same invasive
qualities as the broadcast media. 59 Relying largely on the district court's
findings, the instant Court noted that the nature of the Internet does not lend
itself to chance encounters with unwanted information. 60 Unlike radio or
television, where one could be passively watching or listening and be
surprised by an unwanted message, acquiring information on the Internet
requires some affirmative action on the receiver's part.61 Comparing the
affirmative steps required for Internet use to those required to obtain dial-aporn in Sable, the Court found that the Internet did not possess the qualities
of the broadcast media that warrant less First Amendment protection than is
traditionally afforded to speech.62
Finally, the instant Court relied on the fact that, unlike the broadcast
media, the Internet has never been subject to extensive government
regulation.63 Because, historically, the government has regulated the
broadcast media, the broadcast of indecent material would imply governmental or societal approval or sanction. 64 This danger, reasoned the instant
Court, is nonexistent with the Internet, because unlike the broadcast media,

53. Id. at 2343.
54. Id. at 2343-44.
55. Id. at 2344. "Any person or organization with a computer connected to the Internet
can 'publish' information." Id. at 2335.
56. Id. at 2335, 2344.
57. Id. at 2344. It is estimated that approximately 200 million people will have accessed
the Internet by 1999. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 2343.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 2343-44.
63. Id. at 2343.
64. Id. at 2343 n.33.
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65
the Internet is not regulated by a federal agency.
By giving the Internet the full protection of the First Amendment, the
Court equated the Internet, for First Amendment purposes, with the print
media and the telephone dial-a-porn messages. 66 Although the Internet has
not existed long enough to have a history of expressing the diverse opinions
of our nation, it is in some ways similar to the print media.67 Like the
historical print media,68 the Internet has relatively low barriers to entry.69
For instance, in the past, the availability of many large newspapers, small
town newspapers, and pamphlets gave a potential speaker a choice of many
forums, with relatively easy access, for expression through the print media.
Similarly, the Internet gives a potential speaker easy access to a variety of
means for expression such as e-mail, bulletin boards, and web-sites.
Additionally, because of this ease of access, the Internet provides a forum for
an equal exchange of differing views much like the early print media.7 °
Likewise, the Internet bears similarities to dial-a-porn, which was given
full First Amendment protection by the Court in Sable.71 Like dial-a-porn
messages, the Internet requires affirmative steps in order to access indecent
communications. 72 Dial-a-porn messages require a receiver to dial a
specific telephone number to access the information, while the Internet
requires a user to type in a web-site address or, at least, input search terms.
Therefore, while it is possible that an Internet browser could accidentally
come across indecent information, the possibility is remote for the experienced Internet navigator.73 The instant Court's comparison of the Internet
to dial-a-porn weighed heavily in its decision to give74 the Internet the same
First Amendment protection that dial-a-porn enjoys.
These similarities between the Internet, dial-a-porn messages, and the

65. Id.
66. See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 129 (1989)
(distinguishing the characteristics of broadcasting that give it only limited First Amendment
protection from the characteristics of dial-a-porn); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418
U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (holding that governmental regulation of the press is inconsistent with
First Amendment guarantees).
67. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2335.
68. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 248.
69. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2335.

70. Id. at 2335-36. "From the publisher's point of view, it constitutes a vast platform
from which to address and hear from a world-wide audience of millions of readers, viewers,
researchers, and buyers. Any person or organization with a computer connected to the Internet
can 'publish' information." Id. The Court also noted that "[t]hrough the use of chat rooms,
any person with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than
it could from any soapbox." Id. at 2344.
71. See id. at 2343-44 (citing Sable, 492 U.S. at 127-28.
72. Id. at 2336.
73. Id.
74. See id. at 2343-44.
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print media help explain the Court's reasoning in the instant case. However,
there are some distinguishing aspects of the Internet that make it difficult to
protect children and reluctant adults from the indecent material available on
it. 75 First, the Internet is still a relatively new communication medium, and
while many people are experts at navigating the Internet, others are illiterate
when it comes to computers and the Internet.76 Children are taught about
computers in school, but often their parents remain uneducated in the
operation of computers.77 As a result, the parents are unable to exercise
control in their own homes over what their children access on the Internet. 8
Secondly, even if computer-literate parents keep track of what their
children receive from the Internet at home, if a child accesses indecent
information outside the parents' presence, the parents often have no way of
later detecting the child's access. Unlike print media, which must be
physically present to impart information, once a computer is switched off, the
information that was accessed disappears. 79 Therefore, indecent information
that a child accesses on the Internet is more easily discarded than information
accessed through print media. As a result, unlike a magazine that parents
may find under a child's bed, even computer literate parents may be unable
to discover what material their children access on the Internet. 80 Accessing
dial-a-porn messages, to which the instant Court compared the Internet, also
leaves evidence of access. Because of their pay-by-the-minute format,
monthly phone bills document calls made to dial-a-porn numbers. Thus,
even if parents are not immediately aware of their child's access to such
information, they will discover their child's receipt of the information when
the bill arrives.
Furthermore, adults who are inexperienced in navigating the Internet may
themselves be unwillingly exposed to indecent material.81 While the

75. Protecting children and unwilling adult recipients from indecent information are two
of the justifications used to limit First Amendment protection. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 126,
128 (agreeing that with respect to indecent material the government has a compelling interest
in protecting minors and approving the statute in question because dial-a-porn did not create
a captive audience problem with adults); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749-50 (1978)
(justifying the regulation of indecent broadcasting because of broadcasting's unique
accessibility by children).
76. See Sean Adam Shiff, The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Criminal Liability for
Obscene and Indecent Speech on the Internet, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 731, 754-44 (1996).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 755-56 (discussing parental control of Internet access and the inadequacies
inherent in that control).
80. See id.
81. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2336. Many "adult" web pages contain warnings before
indecent or patently offensive information is displayed. Id. However, it is still possible to
come across unwanted information accidentally during an "imprecise search." Id.
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broadcast media is more intrusive than the Internet,82 the Internet is
potentially invasive to a novice Internet navigator who is conducting a
general search. 3 An inexperienced Internet navigator can come across
unwanted indecent information much like a person who is flipping television
channels can be surprised by an indecent message. 4
By comparing the similarities between the Internet, the print media, and
dial-a-porn, the Court seemingly makes a logical decision. However, the
potential for children to easily access indecent information and the potential
invasion of the home of an unwilling adult are important unique aspects of
the Internet that the Court failed to examine. Had the Court considered these
unique aspects of the Internet, it may not have been as quick to afford the
Internet the highest level of First Amendment protection available.

82. See generally Pacifica,438 U.S. at 748-49 (discussing the imperious presence of the
broadcast media in our private homes). The only affirmative action needed to receive
information from television or radio is turning on the medium.
83. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2336. Only some web-pages that contain indecent information
give the user a warning before displaying the indecencies.
84. This potential for surprise in the broadcast media is one of the reasons the Court has
not given the broadcast media full First Amendment protection. Pacifica,438 U.S. at 748.
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